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OBSERVATIONS ON THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951
ARTHUR H. GOODMANt

A new revenue act is always an easy target and, not entirely by
coincidence, the critical faculty becomes particularly active when the
legislation under analysis strikes one where he can least afford it.
Perhaps the only perfect revenue act would be one in which Congress,
through some now unforeseeable panacea, found it possible to abolish
taxes altogether. Until that happy day, however, the interplay of forceslegal, fiscal, economic and political-attending the adoption of each
revenue act, will be watched with the deepest public concern, and the
finished product pounced upon as unfair, unintelligible, socialistic,
discriminatory, or otherwise contrary to the national interest.
The Revenue Act of 1951 is pointed in the right direction; that is to
say, it increases the tax collector's participation in the national income.
But to the harried taxpayer or, even more so, to his lawyer or accountant
who is only now beginning to comprehend the workings of the newly
adopted excess profits tax, the 1951 Act means far more than a mere
increase in the amount of the tax itself. The method of taxing capital
gains has been changed in certain basic respects;' a "head of a household"
has been introduced and placed approximately midway between the
unmarried taxpayer and the married couple filing a joint return; 2 an
attempt has been made to set at rest the bothersome family partnership
problem; 3 and, among other significant innovations, capital gain treatment of sales of depreciable property between spouses or between an
individual and a controlled corporation is no longer to be allowed.4
The wisdom of the newly enacted provisions would seem, in many areas,
to be not entirely free from doubt; and in certain of the instances where
this is true, a possible flaw may be disclosed by recourse to the experience of the country recorded in antecedent case law or legislative
history. With this end in view and, secondarily, for the purpose of
offering such suggestions as may be warranted, the following observations
are presented.
Alember of the New York Bar.
1. This was done by amendments to Sections 117, 22(n), 23, and related sections of
the Internal Revenue Code. All further references herein by section numbers are to sections
of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by H.R. 4473, 82d Cong, 1st Sess. (19S1).
2. Ir.

REv. CoDE §§ 12(c) and 400.

3. Thr. R~v. Co §§3797(a)(2) and 191.
4. INT. REv. CoDE § 117(0).
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Heads of Households
Section 12 (c) has been amended to provide a new table for computing
the surtax of one who is a "head of a household" as that status is defined
in the section. The effect of the amendment is to extend to single
persons, who come within the terms of the statute, approximately fifty
percent of the benefit of the income-splitting device available to married
couples filing joint returns. To qualify as a head of a household the taxpayer must be unmarried at the close of his taxable year and must
maintain "as his home," by furnishing over half of the cost of upkeep
thereof, a home "which constitutes for such taxable year the principal
place of abode" of a person who is a dependent, except that such person
need not be a dependent if he is a child, stepchild, or descendant of a
child of the taxpayer and is unmarried.
This innovation may, on its face, seem unobjectionable or even
desirable. A bit of history will serve to establish, however, that
congressional policy on the subject is more than slightly confused and
is leading to results less sensible than ever. The Senate Financo Committee Report, in discussing the position of unmarried taxpayers who
maintain households for others, states that they "are in a somewhat
similar position to married couples who, because they may share their
income, are treated under present law substantially as if they were two
single individuals each with half of the total income of the couple." 5'
It is, however, a matter of recorded fact that Congress, in the Revenue
Act of 1948, introduced the present income-splitting procedure only in
order that community property residents would enjoy no advantage
over other taxpayers, and not for any such reason as the one now given.0
Initially, the difficulty was that a married resident of the State of
Washington, for example, incurred substantially less federal income
tax than he would if he lived in New York. Poe v. Seaborn7 the leading
case on the point, was principally responsible for that result, holding
5. Section III-B(2), Report of the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 4473, SEN. REP.
No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (italics supplied). To the same effect see Section III
-B(3), Report of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
on H.R. 4473, H.R. REP. No. 568, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
6. The Report of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
on H.R. 6712, H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) states: "Equalization Is
provided for the tax burdens of married couples in common-law and community-property
States. The bill, with committee amendments to be offered on the floor, corrects existing
inequalities under the estate, and gift taxes, as well as the individual income tax." 1948-1
Cumr. BuLL. 241. The same report states that a "major portion of this bill is devoted to
the geographic equalization of income, estate and gift taxes." 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 241
at 301.
7. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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that the federal income tax levied "upon the net income of every individuaF' is a tax, not upon the earner of the income, but upon the owner
of it, and that the ownership is determinable by application of state law.
The result of the Seaborn case had been anticipated even before
the question reached the Supreme Court. Two attempts were made to
correct the statute so as to avoid the consequences of the Seaborn rule,
but each effort failed.3 The simple and popular thing to do, apparently,
was not to create uniformity by denying community property treatment
to anybody, but by giving it to everybody. And so, income splitting
was born. This, it has since appeared, accomplished nothing, for, in
place of a disparity in incidence of tax liability depending on residence,
there came an equally unwarranted difference between the cases of a married taxpayer, supporting a wife and one child on an adjusted gross income of $50,000 and a bachelor supporting, let us say, five dependents on
the same income. As the law stood prior to the enactment of the 1951 Act,
the unmarried taxpayer, though he supported three more people than
did the married one, would incur well over $4,000 more tax liability.'
This result was so clearly wrong that the head of household provision has been adopted to cure the defect. The new rules bring with
them their own artificial tests and arbitrary criteria. It now makes an
important difference whether a dependent brother lives in the taxpayer's
home or across the street in a residence maintained for him, at perhaps
even greater cost, by the taxpayer. In the first case a dependency deduction and one-half of the income-splitting benefits may be taken; in
the second case the taxpayer is entitled only to the six hundred dollar
deduction. Thus, a serious difference is made to flow from a trivial
and, actually, an irrelevant distinction, and all for little reason or none.
The cause of the trouble is not hard to find. It is, in a word, that piecemeal, year by year thinking produces only patchwork in the way of
legislation. The need is for a broader perspective, an approach which
deals with the problem at its roots.
The first step is to achieve uniformity of operation of the income tax
among the several states. It is respectfully submitted that the adoption
of the following proposed statute would have that effect:
S. The proposed statute, recommended by the Treasury Department, vas as folloxvs:
"Income received by any community shall be included in the gross income of the spouse
having management and control of the community property." This provision was p'zed
by the House in 1921 but was stricken out by the Senate. In 1924 the same provision
was eliminated from the Act by the House and never reinserted. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101, 114 n. 6 (1930).
9. It is assumed, of course, that the married taxpayer files a joint return with his
spouse; it is assumed, also, that the taxable period is the calendar year 19S0 and that
the standard deduction is taken on both returns.
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The gross income of an individual shall be determined without regard to whether
he was at any time during the taxable year a member of a marital community.

This would furnish the "standard or definition of what constitutes an
individual's income," which the Supreme Court, in the Seaborn case,
10
said that it needed in order to avoid the conclusion there reached.
Geographic uniformity having been achieved, there would no longer
be any need for the income-splitting rules adopted in 1948; and, as a
second step, those rules should be repealed. With the end of income
splitting, the inequity, already illustrated, between the operation of the
law on married couples as against single taxpayers, would disappear.
The "head of a household" provisions, designed to correct that situation,
would have become unnecessary and, as a third step, those provisions
could also be discarded. The basic structure would be, then, a body of
tax law operating without respect for state lines, as we always should
have had, and with no regard for marital status, as until 1948 we did
have.
With the law thus stripped of its unnecessary and cumbersome trappings, the remaining problem, not a difficult one, would be that of
making suitable allowances by way of deductions or exemptions for a
taxpayer who supports a spouse or a dependent. The precise amounts
to be allowed by reason of that support need not long delay us here. These
would vary with the times, the basic considerations being, of course, the
need of the national treasury for revenue and the ability of taxpayers
to provide it. Certainly, as Congress now recognizes, it is in the usual
case more expensive to support a wife than a brother-in-law. No fault
could be found, therefore, if the allowances were drawn so as to reflect
that fact.
The essential principle, given due respect under the recommendations
here advanced, is that deductions or exemptions, which rest on the
social fact that under certain circumstances one income provides
sustenance for more than one person, are appropriate only where there
is an actual sharing of income. For the recognition of this principle,
nothing as broad and sweeping as the income-splitting device is necessary
or fair. Nor is that to be wondered at, in view of the fact that a
presumed sharing of income had nothing to do with the adoption of
income splitting in the first place.
In view of the extent of the changes here advocated, it is perhaps
fitting to set forth the advantages that would result from their adoption:
First: The law would be considerably simplified. The sections of
10. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930). The important point, for our purpose,
is that the Seaborn case can be done away with by legislation, no constitutional issue
having been raised or commented upon.
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the code on income splitting would be dropped and the tax return itself
would involve less arithmetic. Also, the new surtax table for heads of
households, as well as the other sections of the code concerning such
taxpayers would no longer be present to add their bit to the general
confusion.
Second: The national treasury could realize as much revenue as it
now does, even if the present surtax rates were lowered; and, if more
revenue were needed in future years, Congress could again raise the
rates to their present levels or even beyond, the advantage being that
Congress would be less concerned, in future revenue acts, with the basic
structure of the law and could, to a large extent, effect its purposes
simply by making changes in the rates.
Third: With reasonable allowances for taxpayers who support others,
the whole structure would be far more fair than it now is or has been
ever since the rather ridiculous community property situation developed.
Fourth: It is not in keeping with candor or clarity that Congress,
in order to explain the adjustment for heads of households, finds it
necessary in 1951 to discover new reasons for what it did in 1948. That
situation, by no means isolated or accidental, is less likely to recur if the
problem is dealt with in the direct fashion here recommended, rather
than in the awkward manner of the committee reports.
Family Partnerships
The problem of recognition of family partnerships is sought to be
solved, at least to a degree, by amending the definition of the term
"partner" in Section 3797(a)(2) to provide that the ownership of a
capital interest in a firm "in which capital is an income-producing factor"
constitutes one a partner "whether or not such interest was derived by
purchase or gift" and by prescribing, in Section 191, statutory rules
governing the allocation of income among the members of a family
partnership. It is the apparent purpose of Congress to reduce the flow of
cases, many of them now in litigation or in various stages of processing
or administrative levels, which present, in one factual setting or another,
the question of what to do about the prime breadwinner of the family
who has divided his business among "his sisters-and his cousins whom
he reckons by the dozens" to the satisfaction of everybody and with
substantial reduction of his own taxes.
Section 191 is, by its terms, confined to "the case of any partnership
interest. created by gift." In order, apparently, to give broader application to the new rules, it is further provided that even where an interest
is purchased by one member of a family from another it "shall be considered to be created by gift from the seller" and in such case "the
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fair market value of the purchased, interest shall be considered to be
donated capital." The key provision of the statute is its first sentence,
which reads as follows:
"In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the distributive share of
the donee under the partnership agreement shall be includible in his gross income,
except to the extent that such share is determined without allowance of reasonable
compensation for services rendered to the partnership by the donor, and except to
the extent that the portion of such share attributable to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the donor attributable to the donor's capital." 1'

It thus appears that the distributive share of a family partner whose
interest in the firm is attributable to donated capital is subject to two
limitations which are: first, that income distributable to donee partners
is to represent only their share of what remains after the donor has been
fairly compensated for his services; and, second, that the participation
of donated capital in the income of the business may not be proportionately greater than the participation of the donor's capital. Thus, in
the typical case of a father who converts his sole proprietorship into a
partnership, giving each of his two sons a one-fourth capital interest in
the firm and retaining a half interest for himself, the amounts taxable

to each son could not exceed one-fourth of the distributable total remaining after an allowance of reasonable compensation to the father for
his services.
The new statutes may perhaps be best understood by first stating
the theme of Supreme Court thinking on the subject before Congress
went to work. The initial expression of Supreme Court opinion was in
Commissioner v. Tower,'2 where the following approach was prescribed:
"There can be no question that a wife and husband may, under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other, purposes. If she either invests capital
originating with her or substantially contributes to the control and management of
the business, or otherwise performs vital additional services, or does all of these
things she may be a partner. . . . But when she does not share in the management
and control of the business, contributes no vital additional service, and where the
husband purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest, the Tax
Court may properly take these circumstances into consideration in determining
whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws."U

This language led to difficulty. It was not sufficiently clear whether
a putative partner might never be recognized for tax purposes unless
"she invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes to
the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs
§

11.

INT. REV. CoDE

12.
13.

327 U.S. 280 (1946).
Id. at 290.

191.
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vital additional services," or whether the Supreme Court, in expressing
itself as it did, was writing inter alia.
In the more recent case of Commissioner v. Culbertson et ux., 4 however, that ambiguity was clarified. There the Court, clearly holding that
a donee may be recognized as a partner, expounded the following thesis:
"The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a partner are
of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly established by
the Tower case, but whether, considering all the facts--the agreement, the conduct
of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital
contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used,
and any other facts throwing light on their true intent -the parties in good faith
and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct
of the enterprise."''

The problem to which these opinions are addressed is that of formulating an approach upon which to distinguish the real from the sham.
It is that difficulty, and only that, which is responsible for the confusion
found by Congress to exist in this area of the law. By far the greater
portion of family partnership cases involves the sole issue as to whether
the transaction on which the taxpayer's case rests ever took place.
The committee reports"0 deplore the confused state of affairs. But
the amendments to the law would seem to suggest that Congress has
failed to understand that the only real problem lies in deciding whether
there is a partnership; and that Congress, not mindful of that fact,
has not come to grips with the basic problem at all. Section 191 relates
only to the attribution of the income of a partnership already found
to exist. Section 3797 (a) (2) is of equally little help, providing only, as
the Culbertson case had already held, that if the transfer of an interest
is real, it is not to make any difference that there was no consideration
for it.
Apart, for the moment, from the question of whether the new legislation will do any harm, it is important to consider how it has happened
that Congress, though cognizant of a bothersome situation and intending
to address itself to the real cause of the trouble, has failed to do so.
One need not look beyond the committee reports to see what is wrong.
The reports state that even since the Culbertson decision, donee partners
14. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
15. Id. at 742.
16. The quotations from the committee reports on the family partnership problem
appear at Section V-Ml, Report of the Contninee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives on HR. 4473, H.R. REP. No. 568, 82d Cong., 1st Sees. (1951), and Section
VTI-A (7), Report of the Senate Finance Connmittee on HR. 4473, Sr.. REP. No. 781, S2d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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have been denied recognition for any one of the several reasons-that they
"performed no vital services"; that the intrafamily gift was made
without "a desire to benefit the business"; or that the gift was "not
complete because the donor contemplates the continued participation
in the business of the donated capital." The reasoning of the congressional
committees is that donee partners, even in cases where the transfers
are proved to be real and not sham, have been denied recognition for
any one or more of the reasons given.
This reasoning is wrong and the fallacy in it explains why the statutes
miss the mark. Performance of services, for example, is not a legal
requirement which must be met in order that the donee of a bona fide
transfer be recognized as a partner. On the contrary, non-performance
of services is one factor, to be considered along with all the other circumstances of a case, in resolving the basic issue of whether any gift of a
partnership interest was really made. Similarly, neither the donor's
desire "to benefit the business" by making the transfer nor his contemplation, when he makes the transfer, that the donated capital will remain
in the business, is a legal requirement, as the committees imply, but
both are useful guides in deciding whether a transaction is a reality or
a pretense.
It is stated at one point in the committee reports that the bona fides
of the parties in forming a partnership is to be passed upon by considering "all the facts and circumstances" involved in the transaction.
But, we are told at another point, "where there is a real transfer of
ownership," the gift is to be respected for tax purposes "without regard
to the motives which actui.ted the transfer." The committees, obviously,
are under the impression that the matter of motive has been considered,
under the case law, separately and apart from the question of good faith.
The fact is, however, that motive has never been more than one possible
test of good faith, to be weighed with the other proof in a particular case.
The committees take issue with the decisions from which, they say,
it appears "that an intrafamily gift of a partnership interest, where the
donee performs no substantial services, will not usually be the basis
of a valid partnership for tax purposes." They observe that "the settlement of many cases in the field is being held up by the reliance of the
field offices of the Bureau of Internal Revenue upon some such theory."
The truth of the matter is that the bureau is not actually relying upon
any "such theory." It is simply unable to satisfy itself, in many cases,
that the gifts were more than paper transactions.
The whole tenor of the committee reports is that the statutes are
expected to expedite the disposition of family partnership cases; this is
to be accomplished, we are left to infer, by the adoption of statutes whtch
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free the law of erroneous theories and wrong rules. The cure adopted
by Congress, it is here predicted, will not work. The reason is that the
theories and rules were not in the law in the first place. They were
criteria by which the courts and the bureau arrived at answers to a
question of fact. And as long as the question of fact remains, the criteria
must still be applied.
The new enactments, besides leaving the essential problem unsolved,
have actually done affirmative harm. Unless Section 3797(a)(2) is
utterly devoid of meaning, its effect on the situation must be that the
gratuitous character of a transfer can no longer be considered as a point
against the taxpayer. Such a rule is not good law because it is not good
sense. The courts and the Treasury Department have heretofore recognized a difference between a sale of a partnership interest to an
adult relative and a gift of such an interest to a trust for a child of three
years. The law should recognize a distinction between these transactions
for the reason that they are widely different in family and in business
life. Forcing the two situations into one mold, as Section 3797(a)(2)
appears to do, increases the difficulty of telling the real from the sham.
Far from simplifying or localizing the issues in family partnership
cases, the statutes now enacted will actually broaden and complicate them.
The matter of fixing reasonable compensation for the donor's services
must arise wherever Section 191 is involved. And we know from experience in cognate types of cases that the task of evaluating personal
services is, all by itself, at least as great a problem as that of attribution
of family partnership income. We may find, therefore, that section 191
actually raises more disputes than it settles or avoids.
Section 191 may also, very possibly, add a new kind of device to the
arsenal of evasive mechanisms heretofore used by taxpayers to deflect
income. A father who divides his business among his sons, retaining no
capital interest in it, may assure himself of a satisfactory income by
making a long term employment agreement with the partnership. If the
conveyance is bona fide, the limitations set forth in Section 191 do not
apply, since that statute relates only to cases where donor's capital and
donated capital are both present. The new rules as to attribution of
income being inapplicable, the parties are free to let the income fall
where the family, as a unit, enjoys the greatest tax saving. To upset
such an arrangement the government must invoke the reasoning and the
authorities governing conveyances to living trusts within families, no
simple matter at best.
In a -word, the whole problem is in a worse state than ever before
and all only because Congress, seeking a ready solution to questions of
fact, thought it could use statutes as substitutes for testimony and exhibits.
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The Supreme Court was doing as good a job as could be asked and
Congress might better have let matters rest as they were.
PercentageDepletion
Section 319 of the new act amends Section 114 of the code to effect
increases in the rates of percentage depletion on several minerals. The
most important of the increases is the one on coal, where the rate was
raised from five percent to ten percent. Ordinarily such a step would
appear to present nothing of absorbing interest to a legal writer. When
read alongside the committee reports, however, it appears that this
change in the revenue law involves more than revenue itself. A rather
important point of principle is at hand.
The theory of percentage depletion is, to state it briefly, that the
owner of a depletable interest in property is entitled to a deduction
whereby he may recover, tax free, the value of a wasting asset during
the years when it produces taxable income. Because the deductions are
in percentages of gross income derived from the property, irrespective
of basis, it is quite possible that the total of the deductions taken before
the asset is fully depleted may exceed the basis.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Anderson v. Helvering,17 stated
the theory as follows:
"Oil and gas reserves, like oher minerals in place, are recognized as wasting assets.
The production of oil and gas, like the mining of ore, is treated as an income-producing
operation, not as a conversion of a capital investment as upon a sale, and is said to
resemble a manufacturing business carried on by the use of the soil. . . The
depletion effected by production is likened to the depreciation of machinery or the
using up of raw materials in manufacturing. . . . The deduction is therefore permitted as an act of grace and is intended as compensation for the capital assets
consumed in the production of income through the severance of the minerals." 18

The Senate Finance Committee Report gives quite a different reason
for increasing the percentage depletion deduction:
"The testimony received by this committee both in connection with this bill and
the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1950 revealed that in a number of cases
nonmetallic minerals which are not in the enumerated group under existing law are
competitive with those receiving percentage depletion, or have just as good a claim
for such treatment as the enumerated minerals. The testimony also indicated that
the 5-percent rate allowed coal is of little practical value and that the coal mining
industry is peculiarly in need of more favorable tax treatment because of the inroads
which alternative sources of energy, particularly oil and gas, have made on the
potential markets of coal." 19
17.

310 U.S. 404 (1940).

18. Id. at 407.
19. Section VI-A (6), Report of the Senate Finance Committee on H. R. 4473, Szrt. RaP.
No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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The same statement appears in the Report of the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives.20
There may have been a time, though perhaps most of us would now
doubt it, when revenue laws were confined to the vexing problem of
raising funds to pay for the operation of government. During the last
war, however, our citizenry became educated to the idea that the revenue
raising power might be exercised to prevent inflation, which is to say
that income might be taxed in order, as the press then put it, "to syphon
off" excess spending money lest the national currency suffer complete
deterioration. Bearing, as it did, some semblance of good sense, this
new reason for using the Sixteenth Amendment could be countenanced.
An increase in taxes accomplished whatever the revenue system had to do
in order to preserve the value of the dollar during a period when dollars
were too plentiful in relation to the available volume of consumer's goods.
Even then, however, percentage depletion meant, at least so far as
recorded legislative history shows, what the Supreme Court held it to
mean and what, in their naive bookishness, tax theoreticians and advisors
believed. The classic explanation of that term is, in view of the position
Congress now takes, no longer valid. Percentage depletion is, today, in
addition to whatever else it may be, a tool by which a kind of competitive
status quo among certain industries is maintained or changed as Congress
deems wise. Whether the coal industry or any other industry should
receive aid through legislation is a broad question involving, undoubtedly,
a great many extra-legal factors; and with that question we are, therefore,
not here concerned. It is clear, also, that the coal industry could have
been given the same competitive benefit through decreases in the
percentage depletion deductions on oil and gas, with consequent gain
rather than loss to the revenue. Here, too, we can only say that this
obvious alternative may have been copsidered and for good reasons
rejected.
Whether, in the judgment of Congress, some special action was needed
by way of granting a subsidy or other form of aid to the coal industry,
lest the nation suffer a loss of needed coal, or whether the difficulty
appeared to relate directly to taxation, requiring that Congress, in the
national interest, make some extra allowance in the tax lftw itself, is
entirely beside the point. No issue whatever is here raised as to the
propriety of whatever end Congress sought to achieve by making the
amendments to Section 114. The trouble is that the wrong means were
used. An allowance or deduction or other congressional concession to
an industry or other body of taxpayers should be called what it is.
20. See Section I, Report of the Committee on Ways and Means of the Holse of Repre.
sentatives on HR. 4473, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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It should not be called percentage depletion if, in fact, it is granted
"because of the inroads which alternative sources of energy, particularly
oil and gas, have made on the potential markets of coal."'"
A serious point of principle becomes involved when, by legislative
action, a legal concept retains its technical name, while it undergoes a
real change in content that is discernible only from committee reports.
From this practice, especially if carried into phases of the tax law which
involve more taxpayers, only widespread confusion and misunderstanding
can result.
CapitalGains and Losses
It was for many years the law that, in cases of taxpayers other than
corporations, a loss of one dollar on the sale or exchange or a capital
asset, realized within the short-term holding period, offset a like gain of
two dollars, realized during the long-term holding period. By the adoption
of certain very appropriate amendments to Section 117 of the code,
it has now been made impossible for an individual or other non-corporate
taxpayer to pocket half of a long-term capital gain, entirely tax free, and
by well synchronized short-term losses, to erase the other half of the gain.
A new method of treating capital gains and losses has been devised and,
in view of its widespread interest to taxpayers, it is here proposed to
illustrate and explain the salient features of its operation.
To begin with, Section 117(b), which formerly provided that longterm gains and losses were taken into account at fifty percent and those
of short-term transactions at one hundred percent, has been completely
rewritten, so that the percentage differential is no longer in the law. In
place of it, however, is a provision allowing a new deduction from
gross income. The provision for the deduction is couched in these terms:
"In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, if for any taxable year the
net long-term capital gain exceeds thd net short-term capital loss, So22 per centum of
the amount of such excess shall be a deduction from gross income.",

Complementing this provision are Section 23(ee), newly enacted, to
allow, "in the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the deduction
[of 50 percentum of the excess of long-term gains over short-term losses]
for long term gains provided in Section 117(b)" and an amendment to
Section 22 (n) whereby the newly created deduction may be taken from
gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income.
A simple example, somewhat more in detail than those offered in the
committee reports,2 3 will serve to illustrate the effect of the foregoing.
21.
22.

See note 19 supra.
InT. REv. CoDE § 117 (b).

23. The reason for using our own illustration is to demonstrate the effect of section
22 (n)(7) on adjusted gross income. The committee reports fail to bring that out.
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Let us assume a taxpayer who had $10,000 of ordinary income and
who during the taxable year sold two capital assets, one, held for more
than six months, at a gain of $5,000, and another, held for less than six
months, at a loss of $3,000. The computation would be as follows:
Ordinary income
$ 10,000
Net long-term capital gain (taken into account
at 100 percent per § 117(b) as amended).
5,000
Gross income
Less: Net short-term capital loss
(§§ 23(g)(1) and 22(n)(6)).

15,000
$3,000

Half of excess of net long-term capital gain
over net short-term capital loss (§§ 23 (ee)
and 22 (n) (7)).
1,000
Total deductions
Adjusted gross income

4,00024
11,000

Under the law as it stood prior to the amendments the result would
have been quite different, to wit:
Ordinary income
Net long-term capital gain (taken into account
at 50 percent per § 117(b) as it formerly read).
Gross income

$10,000
2,500
12,500

Less: Net short-term capital loss (fully taken
into account §§ 117(b), 23(g)(1) and

22(n)(6) )
Adjusted gross income

3,000
$9,500=

The mechanics for computing the alternative tax under the new law
are so devised as to effect the purpose of Congress that, as in the illustration given, the taxpayer's right to exclude from income half of the
long-term gains is superseded by a deduction in the amount of half of
the excess of net long-term gain over net short-term loss. The first
step, provided for in the amended Section 117(c) (2) (A) is to compute a
24.
25.

Net income is arrived at by taking the other deductions allowed by law.
See note 24 supra.
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"partial tax," at ordinary rates, "upon the net income reduced by an
amount equal to 50 per centum" of the excess of net long-term capital
gains over net short-term capital losses. The result of this part
of the computation will be the tax, at ordinary rates, on all of the income
other than the excess of net long-term gain over net short-term loss.
This is so because one-half of that excess will have been eliminated from
net income by the new deduction granted in Section 23(ee), and the
remaining half of the excess, while still part of net income, is, under the
aforequoted language of Section 117(c) (2) (A), eliminated from the base
of the partial tax.
The second part of the computation, based on the amended Section
117(c)(2) (B), is to calculate a tax, at twenty-five percent, on the full
amount of the excess of long-term gain over short-term loss. The
maximum effective rate of tax on capital gains remains unchanged,
for, having taken the gains and losses into account in full amount, we
have proceeded to tax the excess at twenty-five percent with the same
result as though half the excess were taxed at fifty percent 0 The
difference, of course, is that the profit realized by the taxpayer, and
eventually taxed, is now offset by the deduction under Section 23(ee)
and not, as heretofore, by the non-recognition of half of every long-term
gain. In this manner the tax on the capital gains becomes different than
under former law, not by any change in rates, but by a change in the
amount of the excess of long-term gains over short-term losses.
Finally, of course, the partial tax and the tax on the excess are
totalled to reach the alternative tax, which, if it is less than the tax arrived
at by taxing all the income at ordinary rates, is the total tax payable.
In a case where there is no net short-term capital loss, either because
the taxpayer had no short-term transactions or because they resulted in
a net gain, the tax is the same as under prior law. This is illustrated in
the case of a taxpayer who realizes $15,000 of gain in long-term transactions and $5,000 of gain in short-term transactions. Under the law as it
previously stood, the long-term gain would have been taken into account
at $7,500 and the total of $12,500 then taxed either at ordinary rates or
under the alternative method.
Under the new law the gains are added together for a total of $20,000
and then, under Section 23(ee), there is a deduction in the sum of
$7,500, leaving, again, a taxable balance of $12,500. The deduction is
arrived at by taking one-half of the excess of net long-term gain ($15,000)
over the net short-term loss, which is zero.
In a case where there is a net long-term loss exceeding a net short-term
26.

The increase in rate of tax on capital gains is ignored for the purpose of this discussion.
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gain, the taxpayer fares better than he did before the amendments.
Let us assume a net long-term loss of $5,000 and a net short-term gain of
$1,000. The gain, under the new rules, offsets the loss dollar for dollar,
and the taxpayer has a capital loss carry-over of $4,000. Under prior
law the loss would have been taken into account at $2,500 and the carryover would be only $1,500, Section 23 (ee) not entering the picture at all.
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